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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUNITIVE DAMAGES-ALABAMA'S COM-
MON LAW SCHEME OF AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT VIO-
LATE DUE PROCESS. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct.
1032 (1991).
Lemmie Ruffin, Jr. was a licensed agent for Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company (Pacific Mutual) and for Union Fidelity Life In-
surance Company (Union Fidelity).' The companies are not affiliated,
and although Union Fidelity wrote group health insurance, Pacific Mu-
tual did not.2
Ruffin solicited Roosevelt City, Alabama (city), for both health
and life insurance for its employees.3 Presenting himself as an agent of
Pacific Mutual, Ruffin gave the city a single proposal for both cover-
ages. 4 Although the proposal was submitted on Pacific Mutual letter-
head, Ruffin indicated that he would place life insurance with Pacific
Mutual and health insurance with Union Fidelity.5 The city approved
Ruffin's proposal.6 In August, 1981, Ruffin prepared separate applica-
tions for group health insurance with Union Fidelity and for individual
life insurance with Pacific Mutual.7
Arrangements were made whereby the participating employees
paid their premiums by payroll deductions.' Although Pacific Mutual
and Union Fidelity are separate and distinct companies, Ruffin indi-
cated to the city clerk that Union Fidelity was a subsidiary of Pacific
Mutual, and he prepared the billing statement on Pacific Mutual's let-
terhead each month. 9 The city clerk collected the money and then each
month wrote one check to cover the insurance premiums." The checks
were sent to or picked up by Ruffin." Although the employees had
essentially been paying their premiums to Ruffin, he never forwarded




5. Pacific Mut, Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 539 (Ala. 1989).
6. 111 S. Ct. at 1036.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 553 So. 2d at 539.
10. id.
11. Id. Ruffin had arranged for Union Fidelity to send its billings to him at Pacific Mutual's
Birmingham office. 111 S. Ct. at 1036.
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the payments to the insurers.12 Within a few months, the policies were
canceled for nonpayment of premiums." Ruffin had all correspondence
between the insureds and the insurance companies channelled through
him via Pacific Mutual's Birmingham office."' Therefore, neither the
city nor its employees were aware of the cancellations and continued to
pay premiums to Ruffin.' 5
In January, 1982, a participating member of the group health in-
surance plan, Cleopatra Haslip, was hospitalized. 6 After incurring
$2,500 in medical bills,17 she learned that her insurance policy had
been canceled. 18 Because Haslip's insurance coverage could not be con-
firmed, the hospital demanded a $600 payment upon her discharge.' 9
When Haslip's physician was not paid, her account was placed with a
collection agency.20 The agency obtained a deficiency judgment against
Haslip which adversely affected her credit. 2'
In May, 1982, Haslip and three other members2 of the group
health plan filed suit against Ruffin and Pacific Mutual (but not Union
Fidelity) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama, claiming
damages for fraud. 2a The jury rendered a verdict against Ruffin and
Pacific Mutual which totalled $1,077,978.24
12. 553 So. 2d at 539. The premium payments were deposited into Ruffin's own account,
and the money Union Fidelity refunded to the participating employees was deposited into Ruffin's
wife's personal savings account. Id. at 540.
13. Id. at 539.
14. Id. (Ruffin made these arrangements with the help of Pacific Mutual's Birmingham
branch manager, Patrick Lupia.).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Haslip's total medical bills amounted to about half of her yearly income. Ollie L. Blan,
Jr. & J. Mark Hart, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 32 FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec.
1990, at 12. Blan and Hart were among the attorneys who represented Pacific Mutual. Id. at 19.
18. 553 So. 2d at 539.
19. Id.
20. 111 S. Ct. at 1036.
21. Id.
22. Cynthia Craig, Alma Calhoun, and Eddie Hargrove. 553 So. 2d at 539.
23. 111 S. Ct. at 1036-37.
24. 553 So. 2d at 539. The individual plaintiffs were awarded the following amounts: Has-
lip--$1,040,000; Craig-12,400; Calhoun-g15,290; Hargrove-$10,288. Id. Pacific Mutual
was found liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 541-42. The jury was instructed that if
they were "reasonably satisfied" that fraud had been perpetrated upon the plaintiffs, they could,
but did not have to, award punitive damages. The jury was also instructed that in fixing the
amount of damages, they must consider the character and degree of wrong and the necessity of
preventing similar wrong. 111 S. Ct. at 1037 n.1. Pacific Mutual did not object to a lack of




Pacific Mutual appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama.25 The
court affirmed the judgment26 and ruled, inter alia, that a jury could
not possibly have concluded from the evidence presented in this case
that Ruffin's misrepresentations were made mistakenly or innocently.2 7
Accordingly, the punitive damages award was upheld.
28
The United States Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the judg-
ment2l9 and granted certiorari3" to review the punitive damages
award. 31 Pacific Mutual challenged the method of awarding punitive
damages in Alabama alleging that the award was based on unbridled
jury discretion thereby violating its due process rights.32 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, however, and held that the punitive
damages award in this case did not violate the substantive 3 or proce-
dural due process rights of Pacific Mutual. 4 Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
25. 553 So. 2d at 537. Pacific Mutual presented four issues: flawed jury instructions; failure
to grant its motion for directed verdict and judgment not withstanding the verdict; admission of
illegal evidence; and that the punitive damages award violated its rights under the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 539-43. Ruffin did not appeal. In fact,
he did not even appear at trial and could not be found by the Plaintiffs. David 0. Stewart, Puni-
tives Undamaged, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 46, 48.
26. 553 So. 2d at 543. However, a dissenting opinion expressed the view that the award of
punitive damages in this case violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Maddox firmly believed that the United States Supreme Court would hold that such standardless
jury discretion violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 544-45 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 540.
28. Id. Punitive damages are not recoverable in Alabama for innocent misrepresentation or
mistake, but they are recoverable for deceit or willful fraud. Id.
29. 110 S. Ct. 710 (1990).
30. 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
31. 111 S. Ct. at 1037. The punitive damages award was more than four times the $200,000
in compensatory damages claimed by the plaintiff. It was accepted by the Court that the general
verdict included not less than $840,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1037 n.2.
32. Id. at 1037.
33. Id. at 1041. Substantive due process is a constitutional doctrine which requires that no
person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty, or property. The essence is protection from
unreasonable or arbitrary action. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated SchoolDist., 492 F.2d 1, 3-
4 (7th Cir. 1974). In a substantive review, the "Court is concerned with the constitutionality of
the underlying rule rather than with the fairness of the process by which the government applies
the rule to an individual." 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.6, at 13 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
34. 111 S. Ct. at 1043-44. Procedural due process guarantees a fair decision-making process
by the government before it takes an action which impairs a person's life, liberty, or property. It
does not protect against unfair or arbitrary rules. Procedural due process is concerned with the
fairness of the process, not the fairness of the underlying rule. ROTUNDA, supra note 33, § 14.6, at
12. See also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13.1-.10, at 451-520 (3d ed.
1986).
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The controversy over punitive damages in civil cases has raged in
America for over 200 years. 3 On one side of the debate is the view
that punitive damages fill the gap between criminal and civil law by
serving the purposes of punishment and deterrence as well as compen-
sation for the victim. 8 Critics, however, see punitive damages as un-
sound, illegal, arbitrary, irrational, economically unnecessary for the
plaintiff, and economically disastrous for the defendant.3 7 Although
there are 'those who insist that the long history of punitive damages 8
validates their appropriateness, 9 there are also those who insist it is
time for their abrogation.40
Another criticism of punitive damage awards is the imposition of
punitive damages under a vicarious liability theory.41 Proponents state
that those in charge must be held accountable for their agent's miscon-
duct, while critics argue that it violates due process to impose punish-
ment on defendants who have not committed a wrongful act."2 Never-
theless, as early as 1927, the United States Supreme Court held that
the imposition of punitive damages under vicarious liability theory is
not repugnant to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 3
Traditionally, under the common law, jurors have discretionary
power to assess punitive damages." Although this traditional common-
35. Steven H. Sneiderman, Comment, The Future of Punitive Damages After Browning-
Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 51 OHo ST. L.J. 1031, 1036 (1990). See generally Melvin M.
Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society,
49 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1980).
36. See generally James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984); KENNETH R. REDDEN. PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES § 2.2 (1980).
37. Sales & Cole, supra note 36, at 1165.
38. Sales & Cole, supra note 36, at 1119. The Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. provided
for civil punitive damages. Punitive damages also appear in Hittite law in 1400 B.C., the Hindu
Code of Manu in 200 B.C., and in the Bible. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of
punitive damages, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3 (1990).
39. E.g., 111 S. Ct. at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Sales & Cole, supra note 36, at 1171-72 (stating that the historical justifications for
punitive damages have become obsolete)..
41. Vicarious liability is the imputed legal responsibility of one person for the acts of an-
other; it is the imposition of liability on one person for the conduct of another, such as, principal
for agent or employer for employee. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson & Theodore B. Boutrous, Jr., Punitive Damages, Does
Vicarious Liability for Punitives Violate Due Process, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 40-41.
43. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927).
44. Alan H. Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment,
[Vol. 14:143
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law method of jury assessment of punitive damages has been criticized
as arbitrary, it has more than once been upheld by the Court."' In Day
v. Woodworth" the Court upheld the punitive damages award stating
that punitive damages were a "well-established principle of the com-
mon law" and had been for more than a century.'7 The Court declared
that punitive damages are based on the enormity of the offense and
have always been left to the discretion of the jury to decide based on
the peculiar circumstances of each case."'
This common-law scheme of imposing punitive damages and the
discretionary function of the jury to dbtermine those damages was well
settled"9 long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The
Fourteenth Amendment apparently did not change the Court's attitude
toward punitive damages,51 and there is nothing to indicate an inten-
tion by the Amendment's drafters to invalidate the prevailing prac-
tice. 52 The United States Supreme Court rejected a due process chal-
lenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railway Co. v. Beckwith" over 100 years ago. The Court held that the
imposition of punitive damages did not infringe upon due process rights
and The Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 (1991).
45. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042 (1991).
46. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851) (decided 16 years before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47. Id. at 371.
48. Id.
49. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (stating that nothing is better settled than
that is the "peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict").
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 and pro-
vides that, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law .... " Id. at § 1.
51. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885). "The discretion of the
jury in such cases is not controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such
additional damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the practice." Id. See also
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) ("For nothing is better settled than . . . where no
precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to deter-
mine the amount by their verdict.").
52. 111 S. Ct. at 1043. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) ("[i]f
a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it") (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,
31 (1922)); Snyder v.Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 111 (1934) ("[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has
not displaced the procedure of the ages"). But see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970)
("[n]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence
to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack.
53. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
1991]
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concerning deprivation of property.5 4
The concept of "due process of law" did not originate in the Four-
teenth Amendment; "due process" was synonymous with "by the law of
the land"" and referred to customary procedures of old English law.5 6
Under the "settled usage" doctrine,5" well-established traditional proce-
dure cannot be regarded as inconsistent with due process of law.58
The United States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for
determining procedural due process requirements in Mathews v. El-
dridge.9 This "fundamental fairness" test involves the balancing of
three distinct factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceed-
ing; (2) the risk that existing procedures will wrongly impair this pri-
vate interest, and the likelihood that additional procedural safeguards
can effect a cure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest in
avoiding these additional procedures and supporting use of the chal-
lenged procedure.60
The longstanding debate over punitive damages61 has generated
54. Id. at 36. "It is only one mode of imposing a penalty for the violation of duty and its
propriety and legality have been recognized . . . by repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century." Id.
55. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855).
56. See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process
of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 265, 272-75 (1975); A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUN-
NYMEDE: MAGNA CHARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 117-25 (1968). "
57. For a good example of the concept of "settled usage," see Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921). "The due process clause does not impose upon the states a duty to establish ideal
systems for the administration of justice . . . . [The] function [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is
negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform." Id. at 110-
12. See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) ("[a] process of law, which is not
otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled
usage both in England and in this country").
58. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (due process rights are those rights
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and without which "a fair and enlightened system"
could not be imagined); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (due process rights are
those rights "inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (due process rights are those rights
mandated by "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions") (quoting Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908) (due process of law is "ascertained by an exami-
nation of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of
England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil
and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country").
59. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
60. Id. at 335. For an overview of Mathews, see generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 13.8-.9 (3d ed. 1986).
61. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) ("[T]he idea [of punitive damages] is
19911 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
numerous challenges to their constitutional propriety.62 The purpose of
punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future similar
conduct."' Thus, it has been argued that many of the constitutional
doctrines applied in criminal cases should also be applied to the imposi-
tion of punitive damages." These doctrines include the following: (1)
the void for vagueness doctrine;65 (2) the requirement of notice;66 (3)
the protection against arbitrary penalties;67 (4) the double-jeopardy de-
fense;"8 and (5) proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 69
In recent years the debate over punitive damages intensified as the
size of the awards continued to escalate dramatically.71 Coincidentally,
wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of law."); Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis. 1914) ("[tlhe law giving
exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law").
62. See generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983).
63. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS declares:
1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.
2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defend-
ant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused
or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
64. John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA.
L. REv. 139, 139 (1986).
65. Nicholas K. Kile, Note, Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages: Down But
Not Out, 65 IND. L.J. 141, 150 (1989).
66. Kile, supra note 65, at 153-55.
67. Kile, supra note 65, at 155-60.
68. Jewell Hargleroad, Comment, Punitive Damages. The Burden of Proof Required by
Procedural Due Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 147 (1987) (products liability defendants are par-
ticularly subject to multiple lawsuits arising out of one act). See also United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 451 (1989) ("[tlhe protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by
litigation between private parties").
69. Hargleroad, supra note 68, at 115-19. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is
required in criminal cases. However, most courts require only a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard for punitive damages. It has been argued that due process requires that the intermediate
test of "clear and convincing evidence" be applied to punitive damages. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1064 (1991).
70. Robert E. Goodfriend, Preserving Error in Punitive Damage Cases, 53 TEXAS B.J. 1282,
1282 (Dec. 1990). A Cook County, Illinois, study revealed a more than 600% escalation in the
average punitive damage award between 1980 and 1984. See Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds,
Punitive Damages Don't Mesh With Due Process, THE TEXAs LAWYER, May 14, 1990, at 32.
Contra Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1 (1990) (statistical review concluding that there has been no increase in incidence or
amount of punitive damage awards).
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the constitutionality of punitive damages has received increasing atten-
tion by the United States Supreme Court.7 1 In Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Lavoie72 the appellant argued that the jury's punitive damage
award of $3.5 million was excessive and prohibited under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment;73 and that insufficient standards
governing Alabama's punitive damage awards violated due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.74 Although the Court recognized
the importance of these issues,76 it did not resolve them. The case was
remanded for a new trial because of the state court judge's failure to
recuse himself.76
The constitutionality of punitive damages was challenged again in
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.7 7 Although the issues were
presented, the Court declined to reach either the Excessive Fines
Clause issue or the Due Process Clause issue because they were not
raised and passed upon in the court below.78 However, the Court later
rejected an Eight Amendment challenge to punitive damages in Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.79 and held that the Exces-
sive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages awards in civil
cases between individuals."0 The Court deferred the Fourteenth
Amendment question because the issue had not been raised in the dis-
trict court or the court of appeals.8 '
Alabama courts have grappled with the issue of punitive damages
more than most state courts and have consequently developed nominal
71. Goodfriend, supra note 70, at 1282.
72. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
73. Id. at 828. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
For a comprehensive discussion of the historical development of the Eighth Amendment and why
it should be applied to civil punitive damages, see Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause
and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987).
74. 475 U.S. at 828.
75. Id. at 828-29.
76. Id. at 829.
77. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
78. Id. at 76.
79. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
80. Id. at 262-76. For a discussion of the excessive fines question in Browning-Ferris, see
Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine of
Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 907 (1990).
81. 492 U.S. at 277. Nevertheless, four Justices expressed concern over the constitutionality
of standardless jury discretion. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J. with whom Marshall, J. joins, concurring);
Id. at 281 (O'Connor, J., with whom Stevens, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 14:143
19911 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
standards.8 2 Alabama courts concluded that allowing punitive damages
in cases of deceit or fraud serves a legitimate state interest in minimiz-
ing fraud. 83 They also held that vicarious liability advances the state's
goal by creating a strong incentive for vigilance by those who are in the
position to guard against wrongdoing. 4 Although the jury in Alabama
is given significant discretion in awarding punitive damages, that dis-
cretion is not unlimited and, therefore, does not violate due process."
Further, the Alabama Supreme Court established post trial proce-
dures for evaluating punitive damages awards in Hammond v. City of
Gadsen.88 Among the factors to be considered are culpability of con-
duct, desirability of deterrence, impact upon the parties, and impact on
innocent third parties.87 The Alabama Supreme Court's review of puni-
tive awards provides an additional check on the discretion of the jury or
82. Tony Mauro, Digging for Scraps From Punitives Ruling, LEGAL TiMES, March 11,
1991, at 12, col. 2.
83. British Gen. Ins. Co. v. Simpson Sales Co., 93 So. 2d 763, 768 (Ala. 1957).
84. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v.Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927). Alabama law allows
vicarious liability for punitive damages when an agent is acting within the scope of employment
even though the principal did not consent to the acts or even specifically forbade them. See, e.g.,
Autry v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So. 2d 345, 347-48 (Ala. 1985).
85. 111 S. Ct. at 1044. The jury was given these instructions concerning punitive damages
in Pacific Mutual:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory dam-
ages you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you don't have to
even find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but you may, the law says you may award an
amount of money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate the
plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is
also called exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not
feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever
plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct
result they were injured and in addition to compensatory damages you may in your
discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money
recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant
and for the added purpose of protecting the public by deterring [sic] the defendant and
others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless this jury feels
that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into con-
sideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
necessity of preventing similar wrong.
Id. at 1037 n.l.
86. 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).
87. Id. at 1379. The trial courts are "to reflect in the record the reasons for interfering with
a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the damages." Id.
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trial court.88 The court applies a comparative analysis89 and utilizes the
substantive standards established to ensure that the punitive damages
award does "not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals
of punishment and deterrence."9 0 This appellate review ensures that the
amount of the award is reasonable and that the punitive damages are
rational in light of their purpose-to punish the wrongful conduct and
to deter its repetition.9"
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
punitive damage awards in civil cases violates due process in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.92 The Court93 rejected Pacific
88. 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
89. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987).
90. Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989); Wilson v. Dukona Corp.,
547 So. 2d 70, 73 (Ala. 1989); Central Alabama Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377 (Ala.
1989) (the substantive standards include the following considerations: (a) whether there is a rea-
sonable relationship between the award and the harm that has occurred and is likely to occur; (b)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the duration of the conduct including
similar past conduct; (c) the defendant's profitability from the wrongful conduct, the desirability
of removing that profitability, and the desirability that the defendant sustain a loss; (d) the "finan-
cial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions as mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same
conduct as mitigation).
91. 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
92. 111 S. Ct. 1032. The certiorari petition in Pacific Mutual presented the following
questions:
1. Whether Alabama Law, as applied below, violates Due Process by allowing the jury
to award punitive damages as a matter of "moral discretion," without adequate stan-
dards as to the amount necessary to punish and deter and without a necessary relation-
ship to the amount of actual harm caused.
2. Whether Alabama law violated Pacific Mutual's right to Due Process under the
Fourteenth Amendment by allowing punitive damages to be awarded against it under a
respondeat superior theory.
3. Whether the amount of punitive damages in this case was excessive, in violation of
Pacific Mutual's Due Process right to be free of grossly excessive, disproportionate
damages awards.
4. Whether the suit below, although nominally civil, must be considered criminal in
nature as to the punitive damages awarded therein, entitling Pacific Mutual to protec-
tion under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
5. Whether Alabama law discriminates against those defendants subjected to open-en-
ded punitive damages which may be awarded against other classes of defendants with-
out rational basis.
6. Whether the constitutional defects in the award of punitive damages against Pacific
Mutual were cured by judicial review and the potential for a remittur [sic].
Petition for Writ of Cert. as i, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip (No. 89-1279).
93. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justices Scalia and Kennedy filed opinions
concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Souter took no
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Mutual's due process challenge and affirmed the decision of the Ala-
bama Supreme Court.94
The Court acknowledged that this issue was not new to the Court
since constitutional challenges to punitive damages had been raised
before but had always been rejected or deferred.95 The Court also com-
mented on the doubts concerning the due process of punitive damages
expressed by the Court and by individual Justices in recent cases.9 6 The
Court noted that all nine members of the Court expressed concern in
Browning-Ferris97 in which the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment
challenge to punitive damages but left the due process question to an-
other day.98 The Court also discussed its refusal to reach the due pro-
cess issue in Bankers Life9" and in Aetna Life.100 Having recognized
the previous misgivings regarding the due process of punitive damages,
the Court turned to the specific issues presented in this case. 1'0
Before reaching the principal issue, the Court discussed the ques-
tion of vicarious liability and held that imposing liability upon Pacific
Mutual under the doctrine of respondeat superior for Ruffin's fraud
did not violate substantive due process. 02 The Court stated that Ala-
bama's common-law rule which holds corporations vicariously liable ra-
tionally advances a legitimate state interest in minimizing fraud, 03 and
also creates a "strong incentive for vigilance.' 0 4
The Court then considered procedural due process and stated that
the common-law method for assessing punitive damages has been con-
sistent in our history and is not "so inherently unfair as to deny due
part in the consideration or decision. 11l S. Ct. at 1036.
94. 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
95. 111 S. Ct. at 1040. However, the Court has upheld First Amendment challenges to
punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
96. Id. at 1038. The Court acknowledged the long-enduring debate over the propriety of
punitive damages as evidenced by the numerous amicus curiae briefs filed in this case. Id. at
1037-38 n.4.
97. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
98. 111 S. Ct. at 1038-39.
99. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
100. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
101. 111 S. Ct. at 1040.
102. Id. at 1041. The Court found no occasion to question the jury's finding that Ruffin was
acting as an employee and within the scope of his employment when he defrauded the respondents
as it was amply supported by the record. Id. at 1040-41.
103. Id. at 1040-41. Alabama has long applied vicarious liability in insurance cases. See
British General Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 93 So. 2d 763, 768 (Ala. 1957).
104. Id. at 1041.
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process and be per se unconstitutional."10 5 However, the Court con-
ceded that unlimited jury or judicial discretion may invite intolerable
results that "jar one's constitutional sensibilities."10 6 Nevertheless, the
Court declared that it "need not, and indeed . . . cannot, draw a math-
ematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable [punitive damages award] that would fit
every case."10
Next, the Court analyzed the procedural safeguards afforded by
the Alabama courts.10 8 The Court found that the jury instructions 0 9
sufficiently limited the jury's discretion to the purposes of deterrence
and retribution.110 Because the discretion allowed the jury was within
reasonable constraints, the requirements of due process were satis-
fied. " ' The Court concluded that the post verdict procedures whereby
the trial court scrutinizes punitive damages awards, " and the subse-
quent review by the Alabama Supreme Court " s provided adequate
procedural safeguards for the due process rights of Pacific Mutual."
The Court also held that the standard of proof prevailing in Ala-
bama-"reasonably satisfied from the evidence"-when buttressed by
Alabama's procedural and substantive protections is constitutionally
sufficient.' 1 5 Finally, the Court concluded that although the monetary
comparisons of this award"' "may be close to the line . . . it does not
105. Id. at 1040. "[E]very state and federal court that has considered the question has ruled
that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due pro-
cess." Id.
106. Id. See also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA.
L. REV. 705, 739 (1989) ("[y]et punitive damages are a powerful remedy which itself may be
abused, causing serious damage to public and private interests and moral values").
107. 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
108. Id. at 1044.
109. For jury instructions, see supra note 85.
110. 111 S. Ct. at 1044.
111. Id. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984); Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207
(1971).
112. 111 S. Ct. at 1044. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 493
So. 2d 1379 (Ala. 1986).
113. See Green Oil v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989); Central Ala. Elec.
Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 376-77 (Ala. 1989).
114. 111 S. Ct. at 1045. The Court concluded that this review distinguished Alabama's
system from those schemes in Vermont and Mississippi about which the Court had previously
expressed concern. Id. at 1045 n.10. See Bankers Life, 486 U.S. 71; and Browning-Ferris, 492
U.S. 257.
115. 111 S. Ct. at 1046 n.11.
116. Id. at 1046. The punitive award was more than four times the compensatory award,
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cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety."'' 17
Justice Scalia concurred in the decision but criticized the majority
for failing to provide any guidance as to whether other procedures are
sufficient to constitute due process, thereby perpetuating the uncer-
tainty that the decision in this case was intended to resolve. 118 Justice
Scalia expressed the view that it was traditional to leave punitive dam-
ages awards to jury discretion, and maintained that any process that
complies with tradition and that does not violate the Bill of Rights
"necessarily constitutes due process." 119 He then discussed the history
of punitive damages and of jury discretion in awarding those damages,
and found both to be well-settled law prior to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 120 Next, Justice Scalia presented a lengthy histori-
cal discussion of the meaning of the phrase "due process of law"''
tracing it from the Magna Chartal z to the present. 12 3 However, he did
not say that every practice sanctioned by history is constitutional, 2 ,
but conceded that even well-settled historical practices may be invali-
dated if they violate the Bills of Rights. 2 ' Justice Scalia also noted
that although many states have restricted or abolished the common-law
system of punitive damages, and it is within their power to do so, the
common-law practice is not violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 '
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, agreed that history
should govern the decision in this case because such a long-accepted
more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of Haslip, and much in excess of the fine that
could be imposed for insurance fraud under ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5- 11 and 13A-5-12(a) (1982) and
§§ 27-1-12, 27-12-17, and 27-12-23 (1986). Id.
117. 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
118. Id. at 1046-47.
119. Id. at 1047. "I would approve the procedure challenged here without further inquiry
into its 'fairness' or 'reasonableness'." Id.
120. Id. at 1048.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1048. Sir Edward Coke equated the phrase "Law of the Land" from the Magna
Charta with "due process of law," which appears in a 1354 English statute. Coke's view was that
the phrase referred to customary procedures of "the old law of England." 2 INSTITUTES 50 (5th
ed. 1797).
123. 111 S. Ct. at 1052-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1054.
125. Id. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (First Amend-
ment prohibits awards of punitive damages in certain defamation suits).
126. 111 S. Ct. at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring). Many states have limited or even abolished
punitive damages by statute. Id. For an interesting economic discussion of statutory limits on
punitive damages, see Amelia J. Toy, Comment Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit
Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303 (1991).
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legal practice could not have survived if it were irrational or unfair. 27
He also agreed that the long and principled jury determination of puni-
tive damages awards was sufficient evidence of its essential fairness or
rationality.2 8 Justice Kennedy defended the nonuniformity of jury
awards stating that because they are decided on a case-by-case basis
and by a jury which represents the character of the particular commu-
nity, uniform results cannot be expected.2 9 However, he further stated
that "[a] verdict returned by a biased or prejudiced jury no doubt vio-
lates due process, and the extreme amount of an award compared to
the actual damage inflicted can be some evidence of bias or prejudice
in an appropriate case."'' 0 Finally, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Court did not have the authority to alter the rules of common law re-
specting the proper standard for awarding punitive damages.' 3 ' The
Supreme Court in this case, he said, is confined to "interpreting the
Constitution." 3 2
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, stated that common-law procedures
for awarding punitive damages have a "devastating potential for
harm."'3 3 Although the Constitution requires that juries be provided
with standards to constrain their discretion so that they may not exer-
cise their power capriciously or maliciously,3 juries are rarely given
any meaningful guidance, 5 Justice O'Connor contended that not only
are Alabama's jury instructions void for vagueness, they clearly fail to
meet the Mathews test for due process. 36 She maintained that Ala-
bama's post-hoc application of the Green Oil factors' 37 did not cure the
vagueness of the jury instructions because these factors are not given to
the jury. 8' According to Justice O'Connor, the primary component of
Alabama's review mechanism is deference: Jury verdicts are presumed
correct and only the excessiveness of the award is reviewed. 3 9 Justice
O'Connor argued that the Due Process Clause does not permit a state
127. 111 S. Ct. at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1055.
129. Id.
130. Id.




135. Id. (juries are rarely told anything more specific than to do what they think is best).
136. Id. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
137. 539 So. 2d at 223-24. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
138. 111 S. Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1063.
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to classify arbitrariness as a virtue.140
Justice O'Connor asserted that modest safeguards would make the
process significantly more rational without impairing any legitimate
governmental interest."' For example, a "clear and convincing" evi-
dentiary requirement would limit the jury's discretion to the more egre-
gious cases, permit closer scrutiny of the evidence by the reviewing
courts, and signal to the jury that it should be sure of its factual find-
ings before imposing punitive damages."12 Justice O'Connor concluded
that the Due Process Clause demands that the Court adopt some
method either through the courts or the legislature to protect against
arbitrary and capricious awards." 3s
Throughout the United States, punitive damages have been sub-
jected to substantial statutory reform in recent years. "4 In fact, subse-
quent to the filing of Pacific Mutual, the Alabama Legislature enacted
a statute that places a $250,000 limit on punitive damages in most
cases.145 In addition to such monetary caps on punitive damages, other
reforms include the following: (1) raising the standard of proof to
"clear and convincing evidence";" 6 (2) requiring payment of a portion
of the award to the public treasury; 17 (3) bifurcating trials;"48 (4) bar-
ring punitive damages where the defendant has complied with govern-
ment regulations;141 (5) shifting the determination of amount from jury
140. Id. at 1064. The defendants argued that unpredictable jury awards deter wrongdoing.
But, Justice O'Connor stated that unpredictable and arbitrary jury awards allowed juries to inflict
punishment upon citizens "based solely upon bias or whim." Id.
141. Id. at 1061. Justice O'Connor argued that the state has no substantial interest in se-
curing windfalls for plaintiffs. Id. at 1064.
142. Id. at 1064.
143. Id. at 1067. According to Justice O'Connor, a number of procedural safeguards are
available; therefore, the states should be permitted to experiment with various methods and to
adjust those methods over time. Id.
144. See, e.g., Toy, Comment, supra note 126.
145. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1987 & Supp. 1990). Other states have enacted similar stat-
utes. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1990) (punitive damages may not exceed compen-
satory damages).
146. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1990); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80
(Anderson 1991).
147. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1990) (60%); IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1989)
(75%).
148. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58c-5b (1987) (bifurcated trial required); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 510.263 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (same; net worth evidence admissible only in punitive damages
portion of trial).
149. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58c-5 (1987) (FDA regulations); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.80 (Anderson 1991); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.009 (West Supp.
1991).
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to judge;1 50 and (6) allowing punitive damages to be pleaded only upon
proper showing and amendment to the complaint.1 1 Each of these re-
forms serves to limit the discretion of the jury and helps to alleviate the
arbitrariness of the awards.
Two weeks after their decision in Pacific Mutual, the Court re-
manded seven punitive damages cases for further consideration in light
of that decision. 151 Although the Court declined to draw a mathemati-
cal bright line, these remanded cases send a clear signal to the lower
courts that punitive awards must be carefuilly scrutinized to determine
whether they are constitutionally permissible. Although the Court did
not mandate specific criteria, it did say that "general concerns of rea-
sonableness and adequate guidance from the court . . . properly enter
into the constitutional calculus" and noted again its concern about pu-
nitive damages awards that "run wild. 153
Arkansas also utilizes a common-law method of assessing punitive
damages.1 54 Arkansas law does not provide any fixed standard for puni-
tive damages but leaves the measurement of the amount to the discre-
tion of the jury. 5 ' Because it lacks "adequate guidance from the
court,"1 56 Arkansas' common-law scheme may very well be contrary to
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding in
Pacific Mutual may compel the Courts, if not the legislature, to man-
date clear standards for the imposition and review of punitive damages.
150. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80
(Anderson 1991).
151. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 549.191 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1990).
152. Similarly, the Court remanded three additional cases in April, including two from Ala-
bama, and then remanded two more cases in June. Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Jordan, 111 S. Ct.
1298 (1991) (8th Circuit Court of Appeals); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 111 S. Ct. 1298
(1991) (5th Circuit Court of Appeals); Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) (Supreme
Court of Georgia); Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 111 S. Ct. 1.298 (1991) (Court of
Appeal of California); International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299
(1991) (Court of Appeal of California); Pacific Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1299
(1991) (Court of Appeal of California); Portec, Inc. v. Post Office, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991) (10th
Circuit Court of Appeals); Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991)
(Supreme Court of Alabama); AMCA Int'l Fin. Co. v. Hilgedick, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991) (Court
of Appeal of California); Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, 111 S. Ct. 1575 (1991)
(Supreme Court of Alabama); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Koire, 111 S. Ct. 2253
(1991) (Court of Appeal of California); Fleming Landfill, Inc. v. Garnes, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991)
(Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia).
153. 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
154. See, e.g., Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Keck, 298 Ark 424, 768 S.W.2d 28 (1989); Aus-
tin v. Euclid-Memphis Sales, 434 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1970).
155. See, e.g., Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972).
156. 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has issued two opinions in-
terpreting Pacific Mutual.16 In Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co.,1 " an Arkansas case was remanded to review the amount of
the award of punitive damages under the criteria approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual. The court in Robert-
son Oil broadly interpreted the holding in Pacific Mutual and declared,
"Under [Pacific Mutual] we must evaluate both the jury instructions
as to the punitive damages award and the adequacy of judicial review
of the jury's award."1" However, the Pacific Mutual decision does not
mandate any particular criteria. It simply states that the standards fol-
lowed in Alabama in that particular case did not violate due process. 10
The court of appeals also noted that the instructions given to the jury
in this Arkansas case informed the jury only that the defendant's finan-
cial condition could be considered, without instructing it to take into
consideration the character and degree of the wrong as required by the
Pacific Mutual decision."8
In the second case, Union National Bank v. Mosbacher,162 the
Eight Circuit expressed reservations about the constitutionality of the
punitive damages award in light of Arkansas standards, or the lack
thereof, for awarding such damages. 8 The court noted that the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court reviews the punitive damage award only to de-
termine whether it is so excessive that bias or prejudice by the jury is
suspected or whether it shocks the conscience of the court. The court
also noted that Arkansas juries are given considerable discretion in set-
ting the amount of the award and apparently are told little more than
that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter. They are
also told the defendant's net worth. The court was not certain that Ar-
kansas law "provides standards which impose 'a sufficiently definite and
meaningful constraint on the discretion' of the jury."" 4
While it is true that due process may be threatened if juries are
157. Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Mosbacher, 933 F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1991); Rob-
ertson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 930 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1991).
158. 930 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1991).
159. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
160. The holding in Pacific Mutual was actually very narrow, but is being interpreted by
the Eighth Circuit to set standards for due process that are analogous to Alabama's pre-statute
standards.
161. 930 F.2d at 1347.
162. 933 F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1991).
163. Id. at 1447-48.
164. Id. at 1448.
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given unbridled discretion in determining punitive damages awards,
these awards do serve a legitimate and useful purpose. Punitive dam-
ages are a necessary and effective deterrent for willful misconduct.1"5
Nevertheless, there must be a rational procedure for determining and
awarding such damages.
The Court in Pacific Mutual seemed to suggest a necessity for
legislative reform of punitive damages. Statutory guidelines would limit
the discretion of the jury and help to protect the due process rights of
defendants. Although standards must be developed to govern these
awards, these standards should not be rigid and inflexible. The purpose
of punitive damages is best served by allowing these awards to be de-
termined based on the particular facts of each case. The jury should be
allowed to consider factors such as the extent of the wrongful conduct,
the nature and amount of the harm, and the necessity of preventing
future harm from similar conduct.
Furthermore, an evidentiary standard of "clear and convincing"
would limit the awards to the more outrageous cases. However, if the
plaintiff were required to present proof "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
punitive damages would rarely be awarded. Such a demanding stan-
dard may prove too difficult a hurdle for many deserving plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, punitive damage awards cannot be allowed to con-
tinue to escalate out of control and thereby threaten our economy.
These skyrocketing awards are reflected in elevated premiums for in-
surance, higher prices for consumer goods, and spiraling costs for medi-
cal care.
A reasonable alternative to punitive damages is to require the de-
fendant to pay the winning plaintiff's legal costs including attorney's
fees. Under such a system, the plaintiff's compensatory damages would
not be reduced by contingency fees. Therefore, the plaintiff is fully
compensated without being awarded punitive damages and the defend-
ant is punished so as to deter future misconduct. 166
State legislatures are increasingly recognizing the need for reform
165. The conscious disregard for public safety demonstrated by the exploding gas tank de-
sign of the Ford Pinto and similar autos presents a good argument for awarding punitive damages.
See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
166. Vice-President Dan Quayle addressed the American Bar Association on Aug. 13, 1991,
regarding proposed legal reforms endorsed by the President's Council on Competitiveness. Among
the proposals was a "loser pays" rule, bifurcation of liability and damages phases of civil trials,
limits on punitive damages, and a requirement of intent before punitive damages are considered.
Verbatim:'Isn't Our Legal System in Need of Reform?', LEGAL TIMES, August 19, 1991, at 9.
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in the area of punitive damages.167 As more states begin to enact stat-
ues that limit or restrict punitive damages awards, common-law
schemes will become less common. Statutory guidelines will increase
predictability of damages awards, encourage pre-trial settlement, and
relieve congestion and delay in our over-burdened courts.
Melody Sue Peacock
167. See supra notes 144-151 and accompanying text.
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